TP
Tool Permission Review
🔵 Stable🕐 updated 2026-07-21
🔷 SkillSpec L3
pm-seatbelt
Review what an agent is actually allowed to do before you turn it loose — the tool-by-tool audit (each capability's blast radius), the least-privilege pass that removes what the task doesn't need, the dangerous-combination check, and the allow/ask/deny tiering. Use when asked review my agent's permissions, what can this agent actually do, lock down my agent's tools, or is this MCP/tool set safe to grant. Produces the permission inventory with blast radius, the least-privilege cuts, the dangerous-combo flags, and the allow/ask/deny assignments.
What to give it
▸The full capability list — every tool, MCP server, and native power (file, shell, browser, computer use, network) the agent has or would get; the review needs the actual grant, not the intended use
▸The task — what the agent is *for*; least privilege is defined against the task, and "convenience" grants are exactly what this removes
▸The environment's sensitivity — a sandbox vs. a machine with production access, real credentials, and company data (blast radius is capability × environment)
▸The autonomy level — supervised or autonomous; autonomous agents need more denied and more gated, because no human catches the misuse live
✅ The bar it holds itself to
Every skill in this library self-verifies — these are this skill's own quality checks, straight from its definition.
✓Every capability is inventoried by blast radius, not just named
✓Least privilege was applied — grants trace to a task need or they're cut
✓Dangerous combinations are flagged and broken or gated
✓Every survivor is tiered allow/ask/deny and enforced in config
✓Autonomous setups shifted toward restriction with caps and a kill-switch
⚠️ What it refuses to do
Do not grant by convenience — every unneeded capability is pure blast radius
Do not review tools in isolation — the dangerous combinations are where the exploits live
Do not trust the agent to self-restrain — tiers are enforced by config, not by good intentions
Do not grant shell or computer-use casually — they subsume most other tools and deserve the hardest deny-by-default
Do not give an autonomous agent supervised-grade permissions — no human is checking, so the grants must
Install
npx pm-claude-skills add --agent claude # or codex · cursor · gemini · hermes
# or one-line MCP (every skill, any client):
claude mcp add pm-skills -- npx -y pm-claude-skills-mcp
Related skills
🔌 Embed this skill
Drop this on your blog, docs, or site — it renders a "Run this skill" card:
<div data-pm-skill="tool-permission-review"></div>
<script src="https://mohitagw15856.github.io/pm-claude-skills/embed.js" async></script>
💬 Discussion
Tool Permission Review is one of 750 open-source professional AI agent skills — all SkillSpec L3.
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